Aereo: From Working Around Copyright to Thinking Inside the (Cable) Box by Bridy, Annemarie
AEREO: FROM WORKING AROUND 
COPYRIGHT TO THINKING INSIDE THE 
(CABLE) BOX 
Annemarie Bridy 
2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 465 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS  
 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 465 
I.  WORKING AROUND THE LAW ................................................. 467 
II.  THE (CABLE) BOX OPENS ........................................................ 469 
III.  THE (CABLE) BOX CLOSES ...................................................... 473 
IV.  REWORKING THE LAW? ........................................................... 480 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 482 
 INTRODUCTION  
On-demand, on-the-go programming is the new normal in the 
retail marketplace for digital entertainment. As mobile-device 
makers and other innovators jockey to meet consumer demand for 
maximum choice and flexibility, courts are continually challenged 
with figuring out how, if at all, the exclusive rights of copyright 
owners map onto new time- and space-shifting technologies.1 Several 
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 1. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 
417 (1984) (involving time-shifting with a VCR); Cartoon Network LP v. CSC 
Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008) (involving time-shifting 
with a RS–DVR); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 
2001) (involving space-shifting with peer-to-peer file-sharing software); Recording 
Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys. Inc., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 
1999) (involving space-shifting with a portable MP3 player); Disney Enters., Inc. v. 
Hotfile Corp., No. 11-20427-CIV, 2013 WL 6336286 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2013) 
(involving space-shifting with an “online ‘storage locker’”); UMG Recordings, Inc. 
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doctrinally difficult cases in this area have involved streaming-media 
technologies, which implicate the “Transmit Clause” of copyright 
law’s public performance right.2 The first of them to end up in the 
Supreme Court was American Broadcasting Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 
which pitted the owners of copyrights in over-the-air, local television 
broadcasts against a technology company that enabled retransmission 
of those broadcasts in near real time to Internet users on an 
individualized basis.3 Aereo’s copyright odyssey took the company 
from the courts, to the Copyright Office, and back to the courts, 
including a last stop in federal bankruptcy court.4 What began as an 
innovator’s story about the uncertainty of working around 
copyright’s technology-neutral definition of “perform publicly”5 
became a story about the frustration of working within copyright’s 
technology-specific definition of “cable system.”6 Shuttered by the 
district court on remand from the Supreme Court’s decision in favor 
of ABC,7 Aereo is a case study in how pro-consumer innovation can 
get squeezed when courts combine a very broad view of copyright’s 
                                                                                                                
v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (involving space-shifting 
with an online storage locker). 
 2. See WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc. (ivi II), 691 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(involving streaming of over-the-air TV broadcast signals); Cablevision, 536 F.3d 
121 (involving streaming of time-shifted video programming by cable subscribers); 
Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485 (3d Cir. 2003) (involving streaming of 
AM/FM radio broadcast signals by AM/FM radio stations).  
 3. See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo III), 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2511 
(2014) (holding that Aereo publicly performs the plaintiffs’ copyrighted works when 
its subscribers receive retransmissions of those works over the Internet using 
Aereo’s system). 
 4. Emily Steel, Aereo Concedes Defeat and Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 22, 2014, at B2. 
 5. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“To perform . . . a work  ‘publicly’  means 
. . . to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance . . . of the work . . . to the 
public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public 
capable of receiving the performance . . . receive it in the same place or in separate 
places and at the same time or at different times.”). 
 6. See id. § 111 (“A ‘cable system’ is a facility, located in any State, 
territory, trust territory, or possession of the United States, that in whole or in part 
receives signals transmitted or programs broadcast by one or more television 
broadcast stations licensed by the Federal Communications Commission, and makes 
secondary transmissions of such signals or programs by wires, cables, microwave, or 
other communications channels to subscribing members of the public who pay for 
such service.”). 
 7. See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo IV), Nos. 12-cv-1540, 12-cv-
1543, 2014 WL 5393867, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2014) (granting ABC’s motion 
for a preliminary injunction). 
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exclusive rights with a very narrow view of its exceptions and 
limitations.  
 I. WORKING AROUND THE LAW  
Aereo’s initial argument was that its web-based retransmissions 
of ABC’s copyrighted content did not implicate the public 
performance right at all.8 The legal foundation for that argument was 
the Second Circuit’s 2008 decision in Cartoon Network LP v. CSC 
Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision).9 Interpreting the Transmit Clause, the 
Second Circuit held in Cablevision that a cable company does not 
publicly perform copyrighted works when its subscribers use its 
remote-storage digital video recording (RS–DVR) function to time 
shift programming for later playback.10 The RS–DVR’s innovation 
was to move stored, time-shifted programming from hard drives 
installed in subscribers’ set-top cable boxes to subscriber-specific 
portions of servers located at Cablevision’s facilities.11 The shift from 
local to remote digital storage is functionally inconsequential for 
cable subscribers.12 With both architectures, subscribers choose 
which programming they want to record for later viewing; they set 
the system to record that programming; and they control the timing 
of playback.13 
Cartoon Network argued that relocating the storage of time-
shifted programming from hard drives in users’ set-top boxes to hard 
drives on Cablevision’s server was legally consequential, even if it 
wasn’t functionally so. The theory was that playback from 
Cablevision’s remote storage facility to a subscriber’s home TV is 
not a copyright-neutral private performance of the recorded program 
by that user, as it would be if the program were stored locally, but a 
copyright-triggering public performance of the program by 
Cablevision.14 The Second Circuit disagreed, focusing on the fact 
that exactly one Cablevision subscriber is capable of receiving the 
playback transmission of time-shifted programming from that 
subscriber’s remote hard drive: “Because each RS–DVR playback 
transmission is made to a single subscriber using a single unique 
                                                     
 8. Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2508. 
 9. 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 10. Id. at 140. 
 11. Id. at 124. 
 12. Id. at 125. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 136. 
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copy produced by that subscriber, we conclude that such 
transmissions are not performances ‘to the public,’ and therefore do 
not infringe any exclusive right of public performance.”15 Relying on 
Cablevision’s interpretation of what it means to perform a 
copyrighted work publicly, Aereo designed a cloud-based signal 
retransmission system to facilitate only copyright-neutral, private 
performances by its subscribers. Each subscriber controlled a 
dedicated dime-sized antenna that could be activated to retransmit a 
slightly time-shifted broadcast signal—to that subscriber only—
when the subscriber ordered the system to tune in to a particular 
program.16 Just as the location of the subscriber’s hard drive (local 
vs. remote) didn’t matter for Cablevision, Aereo hypothesized, the 
location of the subscriber’s antenna (local vs. remote) shouldn’t 
matter for it. Under Cablevision, as long as a single subscriber 
initiates and receives the transmission of a copy of a copyrighted 
program made by and for that subscriber, the owner of the equipment 
the subscriber uses to make the transmission does not publicly 
perform the program.17  
In much the same way that second-generation peer-to-peer file-
sharing services were designed, with A&M Records v. Napster in 
mind, to avoid secondary liability for infringement of the 
reproduction and distribution rights, Aereo’s service was designed, 
with Cablevision in mind, to avoid direct infringement of the public 
performance right.18 Dismayed by such legal engineering, Aereo’s 
critics faulted the service for attempting to take advantage of a 
purported loophole created by Cablevision’s interpretation of the 
public performance right. Judge Chin, dissenting from the Second 
Circuit’s decision in favor of Aereo, called the service “a sham” and 
“a Rube Goldberg-like contrivance.”19 Justice Roberts, at oral 
                                                     
 15. Id. at 139. 
 16. The slight time delay in the retransmission of the signal occurred 
because the retransmission was being made from a buffer copy of the program. If 
Cablevision’s holding is read as being limited to the time-shifted playback of 
subscriber-made copies, this design feature arguably brought the system’s “watch 
now” feature into alignment with Cablevision.  
 17. Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 139. 
 18. See Jordan Crook, Streaming TV Startup Aereo Files Appeal in Network 
Case, Cites Cablevision Precedent, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 22, 2012), 
http://techcrunch.com/2012/10/22/streaming-tv-startup-aereo-files-appeal-in-
network-case-cites-cablevision-precedent/ (discussing Aereo’s reliance on 
Cablevision in the design of its system). 
 19. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo II), 712 F.3d 676, 697 (2d Cir. 
2013) (Chin, J., dissenting). As the district court judge in Cablevision, Judge Chin 
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argument in the Supreme Court, similarly accused Aereo of trying to 
work an angle: “[T]here’s no technological reason for you to have 
10,000 dime-sized antenna[s], other than to get around the copyright 
laws.”20 Among scholars, Jane Ginsburg and Rebecca Giblin worried 
that a victory in the case for Aereo would encourage a perverse trend 
of “Aereoization,” in which entrepreneurs design technically 
inefficient content-delivery systems with the strategic aim of 
avoiding copyright liability.21 Dan Burk took a more sanguine view 
of Aereo’s effort to design a system to avoid the reach of copyright.22 
Invoking the patent law concept of “inventing around” patent claims, 
Burk concluded that allowing latitude for “technological avoision” à 
la Aereo might be good policy, insofar as it has the potential to drive 
innovation in content reproduction and delivery—a domain in which 
copyright owners invested in incumbent technologies may lack 
adequate incentives to break new ground.23 Unfortunately for Aereo, 
the Supreme Court majority couldn’t get past what comes across in 
the opinion as a gut feeling that Aereo was too clever by half.  
 II. THE (CABLE) BOX OPENS  
In the Supreme Court, Aereo was argued and ultimately 
decided as a case about cable TV and cable-related amendments to 
the 1976 Copyright Act. ABC argued that Aereo was less an Internet 
innovator than a cable imitator and, as such, should be covered by 
                                                                                                                
had granted summary judgment for Cartoon Network, a decision that was reversed 
by the Second Circuit. Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 124. He was subsequently elevated 
to the Second Circuit.  
 20. Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) 
(No. 13-461). 
 21. See Rebecca Giblin & Jane C. Ginsburg, We Need to Talk About Aereo: 
Copyright-Avoiding Business Models, Cloud Storage and a Principled Reading of 
the “Transmit” Clause 21-22 (Columbia Law Sch., Working Paper No. 480, 2014), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2443595 (coining 
the term “Aereoization” to describe a process by which businesses design their 
systems, in keeping with the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Cablevision and Aereo II, 
to “sufficiently mimic free consumer uses” that they escape legal liability for 
publicly performing copyrighted works); see also Julie Borna, Note, Aereo: Cutting 
the Cord or Splitting the Circuit?, 22 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 287, 315 (2014) 
(arguing that Aereo should not be permitted to “bypass copyright laws”). 
 22. See Dan L. Burk, Inventing Around Copyright, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 64 
(2014). 
 23. Id. at 74-76 (suggesting that inventing around copyright, in some cases, 
might lead to useful innovation and not just inefficient, liability-circumventing 
design). 
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1976 amendments to the definition of “perform publicly” that were 
intended by Congress to bring cable retransmissions of over-the-air 
TV broadcasts within the scope of the public performance right.24 
Not surprisingly, ABC wanted to have its cake and eat it too on the 
question of the functional similarity between Aereo’s “watch now” 
service and cable retransmissions. On the one hand, ABC argued, 
Aereo was too much like a cable system to escape the reach of the 
public performance right in § 106(4) of the Copyright Act.25 On the 
other hand, it urged, Aereo was not enough like a cable system to 
qualify for the compulsory retransmission license in § 111.26 In a 
nutshell, ABC wanted a holding that Aereo is like cable when it 
comes to the statutory duty to pay but not like cable when it comes to 
the statutory right to pay less than market rates.  
ABC’s stance was obviously asymmetric, considering the 
policy quid pro quo underlying the 1976 amendments that brought 
cable retransmissions within the scope of § 106(4).27 Those 
amendments superseded two judicial decisions, Teleprompter Corp. 
v. Columbia Broadcasting System and Fortnightly Corp. v. United 
Artists Television, Inc., which had held that cable retransmissions of 
over-the-air broadcasts were not remunerable “public performances” 
because CATV providers were more like viewers than broadcasters.28 
At the same time as Congress repudiated Teleprompter and 
Fortnightly by adding the Transmit Clause to the definition of 
“perform publicly,” thus allowing copyright owners to capture 
revenue from cable retransmissions, it created the compulsory 
license in § 111 to give newly burdened cable operators relief from 
the prohibitive transaction costs associated with market-based 
licensing of retransmitted content.29 The legislative history of the 
                                                     
 24. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 20, at 3. 
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. at 6. 
 27. See E. Microwave, Inc. v. Doubleday Sports, Inc., 691 F.2d 125, 132 
(2d Cir. 1982) (“Congress drew a careful balance between the rights of copyright 
owners and those of CATV systems, providing for payments to the former and a 
compulsory licensing program to insure that the latter could continue bringing a 
diversity of broadcasted signals to their subscribers.”).  
 28. See Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2504-05 (2014) (discussing 
Teleprompter and Fortnightly and explaining that Congress amended the Copyright 
Act in 1976 largely to reject the holdings in those two cases). 
 29. The legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976 explains why the 
two amendments were coupled. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 89 (1976) (“In 
general, the Committee believes that cable systems are commercial enterprises 
whose basic retransmission operations are based on the carriage of copyrighted 
program material and that copyright royalties should be paid by cable operators to 
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1976 Copyright Act makes it clear that the two amendments were a 
package deal intended to strike a balance between copyright owners 
and cable-system operators for the ultimate benefit of the public.30 
ABC, however, wanted the amendments viewed in isolation from 
each other.  
Aereo’s initial position in the case was that its service was not 
enough like a cable system, architecturally speaking, to bring its 
retransmissions within the scope of the public performance right.31 It 
pointed out, ultimately to no avail, that cable systems receive 
broadcast content in a single feed and continuously retransmit that 
content to each customer, regardless of whether the customer has 
tuned in or not.32 This technical detail was legally irrelevant in the 
majority’s view, even though it is completely germane to the 
question of who initiates a content retransmission and thereby 
“performs” the retransmitted work.33 Cable systems, Aereo argued, 
initiate cable retransmissions to all subscribers and thereby publicly 
perform the retransmitted programs; Aereo’s users, by contrast, 
initiate Aereo retransmissions only to themselves and thereby 
privately perform the programs.34  
The majority ultimately agreed with ABC.35 Its opinion, which 
focuses anachronistically on copyright law’s evolving treatment of 
cable systems, is a doctrinally unsatisfying shortcut in a case that 
demanded a careful parsing of the Transmit Clause and a direct 
reckoning with the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Cablevision. 
                                                                                                                
the creators of such programs. The Committee recognizes, however, that it would be 
impractical and unduly burdensome to require every cable system to negotiate with 
every copyright owner whose work was retransmitted by a cable system. 
Accordingly, the Committee [will] establish a compulsory copyright license for the 
retransmission of those over-the-air broadcast signals that a cable system is 
authorized to carry . . . .”). 
 30. See E. Microwave, Inc., 691 F.2d at 132 (discussing the balance 
Congress struck and stating that “[t]he public interest . . . lies in a continuing supply 
of varied programming to viewers”). 
 31. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 20, at 28 (arguing that 
Aereo is an equipment provider and not a cable system). 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2507 (“[T]his sole technological difference 
between Aereo and traditional cable companies does not make a critical difference 
here.”). But see id. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that volitional conduct 
by the defendant is necessary for direct infringement and that Aereo’s viewers, not 
Aereo, engaged in volitional conduct with respect to choice of programming on 
Aereo’s system).  
 34. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 20, at 28. 
 35. Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2511 (majority opinion). 
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Instead of producing a rigorous statutory analysis that could serve as 
a useful guide to lower courts deciding future public performance 
cases, the Court expediently tethered Aereo to an established, legally 
assimilated technology and attempted to limit the case to its facts, 
particularly with respect to its implications for the burgeoning cloud-
computing industry.36 The majority held that Aereo, as a service 
functionally indistinguishable from cable, publicly performed the 
copyrighted works it retransmitted, even though each transmission 
was initiated by and delivered to a single user by means of 
equipment controlled exclusively by that user.37 In a scathing dissent, 
Justice Scalia criticized the majority’s reasoning as “[g]uilt [b]y 
[r]esemblance.”38
The majority’s “walks like a duck and quacks like a duck”
rationale suggested that Aereo might fall within the definition of a 
“cable system” in § 111, making it eligible for the compulsory 
retransmission license. At oral argument, Justice Sotomayor wanted 
to explore that possibility: “Why aren’t they a cable company?” she 
asked ABC’s counsel.39 “I look at the definition of a cable company, 
and it seems to fit. . . . We say they’re a cable company, they get the 
compulsory license.”40 The logic is perfectly straightforward—only 
that isn’t how the case came out. The majority’s opinion held only 
that Aereo is impossible to differentiate from a cable system for 
purposes of § 106(4), not that it is a cable system for purposes of 
§ 111.41 The Justices left for another day and another court the 
question of whether the former necessarily implies the latter. 
                                                     
36. Other commentators share my dim view of the opinion and its value for 
deciding future cases. See, e.g., Matthew Sag, The Uncertain Scope of the Public 
Performance Right After American Broadcasting Companies v. Aereo, Inc. 12
(Loyola Univ. Chi. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper, Paper 
No. 2014-017), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2529047 (“The majority’s
‘looks like a cable system’ approach makes the public performance right almost 
incomprehensible.”); see also Ira Steven Nathenson, Aereo’s Errors, 2 J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 171, 193 (2014) (arguing that the majority’s opinion is “unnecessary, 
unsound, and unwise”).
37. See Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2511. 
38. Id. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
39.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 20, at 4-5. 
40. Id.
41. See Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. at 2506 (majority opinion) (stating that 
“Aereo’s activities are substantially similar to those of the CATV companies that 
Congress amended the Act to reach”).
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III. THE (CABLE) BOX CLOSES 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision, Aereo suspended 
operations42 and, in a last-ditch effort to save itself, pivoted quickly 
on the issue of its affinity with cable. In a letter to the district court 
concerning next steps in the litigation, Aereo argued that the 
Supreme Court’s decision amounted to a holding that it was, as a 
matter of law, a cable system.43 As such, Aereo asserted its right to a 
§ 111 license.44 The move, as the district court would later describe 
it, was Aereo’s effort to make lemonade from the lemons it had been 
given by the Supreme Court.45 Aereo promptly filed statements of 
account and royalty fees with the Copyright Office, claiming 
entitlement to a § 111 license.46 The Copyright Office declined to 
process the filings, citing WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., a case in which the 
Second Circuit—in an opinion written by Aereo’s dissenter, Judge 
Chin—held that § 111’s definition of “‘cable system’” does not 
cover an Internet service that streams broadcast TV signals to a 
nationwide audience.47 On remand in the district court, ABC moved 
for a preliminary injunction, which it won in a decision that relied 
heavily on ivi.48 Shortly thereafter, Aereo filed for bankruptcy.49
The outcome in Aereo was the predictable result of a copyright 
system that hardwires a lack of balance between rights and 
                                                     
42. Emily Steel, Stung by Supreme Court, Aereo Suspends Service, N.Y.
TIMES, June 29, 2014, at A20. 
43. Letter from Bruce P. Keller to the Honorable Alison J. Nathan (July 9, 
2014), available at http://www.tellusventure.com/downloads/federal/scotus/joint_ 
letter_to_nathan_9jul2014.pdf (“Under the Second Circuit’s precedents, Aereo was 
a provider of technology and equipment with respect to the near-live transmissions 
at issue in the preliminary injunction appeal. After the Supreme Court’s decision, 
Aereo is a cable system with respect to those transmissions.”).
44. Id.
45. See Aereo IV, Nos. 12-cv-1540, 12-cv-1543, 2014 WL 5393867, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2014) (“Doing its best to turn lemons into lemonade,  Aereo  
now seeks  to  capitalize  on  the  Supreme  Court’s  comparison of it to a CATV 
system . . . .”).  
46. See Letter from Jacqueline C. Charlesworth, Gen. Counsel & Assoc. 
Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office, to Matthew Calabro (July 16, 2014), 
available at http://www.nab.org/documents/newsRoom/pdfs/071614_Aereo_ 
Copyright_Office_letter.pdf (acknowledging the Copyright Office’s receipt of 
Aereo’s statements of account and associated royalty and filing fees for the § 111 
license). 
47. See ivi II, 691 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that ivi is not a “‘cable 
system’” under § 111). 
48. Aereo IV, 2014 WL 5393867 at *4-5.
49. See Steel, supra note 4. 
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exceptions—giving a broad, technology-neutral scope to the former 
and a narrow, technology-specific scope to the latter.50 This dynamic 
holds in both policy making and judicial decision making. As Julie 
Cohen has observed, “[c]opyrights have a protean quality, expanding 
into every avenue of potential profit,” whereas “copyright limitations 
generally have not demonstrated a parallel capacity to evolve as 
technologies change.”51 The Transmit Clause and § 111 were 
incorporated simultaneously into copyright law to mediate, and strike 
a balance in, “the cable-copyright controversy.”52 The Transmit 
Clause, however, sweeps much more broadly than § 111 does in 
terms of covered technology. It is clear from the legislative history of 
the 1976 Act that Congress added the Transmit Clause to capture for 
copyright owners markets created by whatever new technologies 
might emerge for delivering content at a distance. 
The definition of “transmit”—to communicate a performance or display 
“by any device or process whereby images or sound are received beyond 
the place from which they are sent”—is broad enough to include all 
conceivable forms and combinations of wires and wireless 
communications media, including but by no means limited to radio and 
television broadcasting as we know them. Each and every method by 
which the images or sounds comprising a performance or display are 
picked up and conveyed is a “transmission,” and if the transmission 
reaches the public in any form, the case comes within the scope of clauses 
(4) or (5) of section 106.53 
The amendment that brought cable TV retransmissions within the 
scope of § 106(4) proactively brought the Internet, and streaming, 
along with it.  
The legislative history of § 111, by contrast, is much more 
tightly focused on existing technology: “For the most part,” the 
House Report explains, “the section is directed at the operation of 
                                                     
 50. See, e.g., WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc. (ivi I), 765 F. Supp. 2d 594, 603-04 
n.10  (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Compulsory licenses are exceptions to the copyright laws, 
and . . . we generally construe the exceptions narrowly . . . .” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); CBS Broad., Inc. v. EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 265 F.3d 1193, 
1209 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating that the statutory license in § 119 for secondary 
transmissions of TV broadcast signals by satellite carriers is a narrow exception to 
the generally applicable public performance right). See generally Tasini v. N.Y. 
Times Co., 206 F.3d 161, 168 (2d Cir. 2000), aff’d, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (invoking 
the canon to narrowly construe an exception in 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) to copyright’s 
default ownership rules). 
 51. JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND 
THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 242 (2012). 
 52. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 48, 89 (1976). 
 53. Id. at 64 (emphasis added). 
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cable television systems.”54 Notwithstanding this specificity, the 
definition of “cable system” in § 111 leaves some room for post-
1976 technological developments:  
A “cable system” is a facility . . . that in whole or in part receives signals 
transmitted or programs broadcast by one or more television broadcast 
stations licensed by the Federal Communications Commission, and makes 
secondary transmissions of such signals or programs by wires, cables, 
microwave, or other communications channels to subscribing members of 
the public who pay for such service.55 
The generality of both the word “facility” and the phrase “other 
communications channels” arguably evinces congressional intent not 
to limit the reach of § 111 to the 1976 state of the art in signal 
retransmission.56 Moreover, the requirement in § 111(c) that the 
secondary retransmitter’s carriage of signals be “permissible under 
the rules . . . of the Federal Communications Commission” need not 
be read, as the Copyright Office has narrowly read it, to mean that 
the retransmitter must be affirmatively regulated by those rules.57 The 
                                                     
 54. Id. at 88. 
 55. 17 U.S.C. § 111(f)(3) (2012). 
 56. The Copyright Office has insisted that “‘other communications 
channels’” should not be understood “to include ‘future unknown services.’” ivi II, 
691 F.3d 275, 284 (2d Cir. 2012). The statutory language is superfluous, however, if 
it cannot be read to include any new technologies. At the Copyright Office’s behest, 
Congress amended the Copyright Act in 1988 to create a new compulsory license 
for satellite carriers and again in 1994 to expressly include microwave 
retransmissions within the scope of § 111. Id. at 281-82. Such technology-specific 
amendments arguably were not needed in light of § 111’s inclusion of the catch-all 
phrase “other communications channels.” Reading that phrase to encompass post-
1976 technologies, the Eleventh Circuit held in 1991 that a satellite carrier was a 
“cable system” entitled to the § 111 license. See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Satellite Broad. 
Networks, Inc. (SBN), 940 F.2d 1467, 1469 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991) (“A question arises 
whether a transmission via satellite is one through ‘other communications channels.’ 
We think so. The legislative history shows that in considering the Copyrights Act, 
Congress understood that the development of satellites promised a new channel for 
communicating in the future.”). The Eleventh Circuit found the Office’s 
exclusionary reasoning “unpersuasive.” Satellite Broad. & Commc’ns Ass’n of Am. 
v. Oman, 17 F.3d 344, 346 (11th Cir. 1994). Notwithstanding that holding, the 
Copyright Office issued a rule in 1992 that excluded satellite carriers from § 111. Id. 
In 1994, giving Chevron deference to that rule, the Eleventh Circuit reversed its 
earlier decision. Id. at 348.  
 57. 17 U.S.C. § 111(c)(1); see ivi I, 765 F. Supp. 2d 594, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011), aff’d, 691 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2012) (explaining the Copyright Office’s 
position that the compulsory license and FCC regulations go hand-in-hand, so that 
the license is available only to entities regulated by the FCC). But see SBN, 940 F.2d 
at 1471, superseded by regulation, as stated in Satellite Broad. & Commc’ns Ass’n 
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Second Circuit acknowledged in ivi that the definition of “cable 
system” in § 111 does not foreclose a reading that would cover a 
service that retransmits signals over the Internet.58  
In spite of the leeway left for new technology in the statutory 
text, the Copyright Office has chosen to interpret § 111 to 
categorically exclude Internet services, no matter the lengths to 
which those services go to prevent piracy and to limit the geographic 
reach of their retransmissions.59 In 2000, implicitly conceding that 
the definition of “cable system” in the statute could be read to 
include Internet retransmitters, the Register of Copyrights pushed  
for  an  amendment  to  “clarify”  that  the § 111 statutory license did 
not apply to broadcast retransmissions over the Internet.60 The 
amendment, which was included in legislation to reauthorize the 
statutory license for satellite carriers in § 119, was removed from the 
bill before it passed.61 Congress thereby left ajar a door that the 
Copyright Office wanted to see definitively closed.  
The reasons for the Copyright Office’s position on Internet 
retransmissions are intimately aligned with the technical concerns 
and financial interests of copyright owners. One impetus for the 
failed amendment was the Office’s perception—post-Napster—that 
the Internet is just not a safe place for copyrighted content.62 The 
overarching motivation, however, was the Office’s long-held 
institutional belief, approaching an article of faith, that “the 
[Copyright Act] should be interpreted in a way that best compensates 
copyright owners.”63 In keeping with this revenue-maximization 
                                                                                                                
of Am., 17 F.3d at 348 (interpreting “permissible” under FCC regulations to mean 
simply that “no rule or regulation forbade it”). 
 58. See ivi II, 691 F.3d at 280.  
 59. See ivi I, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 604 (“It is the unwavering opinion of the 
Copyright Office that a distributor of broadcast programming over the Internet does 
not qualify for a compulsory license as a cable system under Section 111.”).  
 60. Id. at 610 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 61. Id.; see also ivi II, 691 F.3d at 282 n.7 (stating that the amendment was 
removed from the legislation “[f]or indiscernible reasons”). 
 62. See ivi I, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 611 (“The Office’s principal concern was 
the perceived lack of ability to control the geographic scope of Internet 
retransmissions[, which] raise[s] the possibility of piracy . . . .”); U.S. COPYRIGHT 
OFFICE, SATELLITE HOME VIEWER EXTENSION AND REAUTHORIZATION ACT SECTION 
109 REPORT 181 (2008) [hereinafter SHVERA REPORT], available at 
http://copyright.gov/reports/section109-final-report.pdf (citing “serious questions 
about signal security” as a reason for excluding Internet retransmissions from the 
scope of § 111). 
 63. SHVERA REPORT, supra note 62, at 109; see also ivi I, 765 F. Supp. 2d 
at 612 (stating the Copyright Office’s position that expanding the statutory license to 
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principle, the Office has called for  the  outright  elimination  of  the 
§ 111 and § 119 statutory licenses, arguing that the transaction costs 
associated with clearing copyrights are not unduly burdensome and 
can be minimized through privately ordered solutions.64 It is thus not 
surprising that the Office, whenever it has been called upon to do so, 
has construed the scope of § 111 in a vanishingly narrow way.65 
As the governmental entity charged with administering 
statutory licenses, the Copyright Office has enjoyed considerable 
judicial deference with respect to its interpretation of § 111—perhaps 
more than it deserves.66 It has always been consistent in its position 
that Internet services retransmitting over-the-air broadcast signals 
fall outside the definition of “cable system,” but it has been less than 
consistent in its explanation for why that is so. As a general rule, it 
has said, “new systems” should be eligible for the § 111 license if 
they are “substantially similar to those systems that already use 
Section 111.”67 What, then, is substantial similarity to existing cable 
systems? ivi explains, at least, what it is not. Relying heavily on 
documents from the Copyright Office, the district court concluded 
that ivi’s system was “vastly different” from existing cable systems 
for two reasons: it did not limit its retransmissions to local markets, 
and it “refuse[d] to comply with the rules and regulations of the 
FCC.”68 One might infer from ivi that a new system would be 
substantially similar to cable if it were to limit its retransmissions to 
local markets and comply with FCC regulations for cable systems 
                                                                                                                
include Internet retransmitters would “wrest control away from program producers” 
and “leav[e] content owners with relatively little bargaining power in the 
distribution of broadcast programming”). 
 64. See SHVERA REPORT, supra note 62, at 70 (“It is now time to phase 
out Section 111 and Section 119 so that copyright owners can negotiate market rates 
for the carriage of programming retransmitted by MVPDs.”). 
 65. See Paul Glist, Cable Copyright: The Role of the Copyright Office, 35 
EMORY L.J. 621, 628, 636 (1986) (arguing that the Office willfully construes § 111 
narrowly and that it has frustrated reasonable use of the compulsory license by cable 
operators). 
 66. See ivi II, 691 F.3d at 279 (applying Chevron deference to the 
Copyright Office’s decision about eligibility for the § 111 license). But see 
Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 490 (3d Cir. 2003) (declining to 
decide whether Chevron or Skidmore deference should apply to the Copyright 
Office’s interpretation of the § 114 statutory license); Cablevision, 536 F.3d 121, 
129 (2d Cir. 2008) (applying only Skidmore deference to a Copyright Office report 
on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act). 
 67. See SHVERA REPORT, supra note 62, at 181. 
 68. ivi I, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 604. 
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under the Communications Act.69 As it turns out, however, those are 
not sufficient conditions for eligibility in the eyes of the Copyright 
Office. 
Years before ivi was litigated, the Copyright Office had already 
decided in the case of Capitol Broadcasting Company (CBC) that not 
even secure, localized signal retransmission and full compliance with 
FCC rules governing cable systems could bring an Internet service 
within the scope of § 111.70 CBC, aware of the Office’s concerns 
about signal security and localization, had designed a three-tiered 
security system to ensure that the signals it retransmitted over the 
Internet would not travel beyond the local markets for which they 
were intended.71 The bespoke system, CBC explained in comments 
to the Copyright Office in 2007, was “the functional equivalent of in-
market ‘intranet’ security arrangements widely used to restrict access 
to private, internal Internet communications.”72 The measures CBC 
proposed to implement were, in fact, more secure than those then in 
use by cable and satellite retransmitters.73 The Copyright Office 
conceded that CBC’s system was “tightly secured and walled off 
from the open Internet,” but that didn’t matter: “Massive signal 
security,” the Office wrote in a report to Congress, “does not 
immunize the system from the potential pitfalls of a distribution 
model that essentially relies on the Internet. Once a secure system is 
‘cracked,’ content leakage will ensue and massive unauthorized 
redistribution will occur.”74
For an Internet service aspiring to a § 111 license, the de facto 
position of the Copyright Office is that nothing less than perfect 
security will do when it comes to signal localization; however, 
perfect security is impossible in any system, whether the 
                                                     
69. See ivi II, 691 F.3d at 284 (summarizing the Copyright Office’s position 
that “the compulsory license applies only to localized retransmission services 
regulated as cable systems by the FCC” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
70. See SHVERA REPORT, supra note 62, at 194 (“[T]he Office does not 
recommend expanding the existing licenses to encompass CBC’s system at this 
time.”).
71. See CAPITOL BROAD. CO., INC., COMMENTS OF CAPITOL BROADCASTING 
COMPANY, INCORPORATED 5-10 (2007), available at http://www.copyright.gov/ 
docs/section109/comments/capitol-broadcasting.pdf (explaining, in detail, the 
technical elements of CBC’s three-layer security system, which consisted of (1) 
geocoding and credit card validation; (2) continuous location verification using a 
patent-pending USB antenna to receive local FM radio signals; and (3) signal-
encryption and digital-rights-management software). 
72. Id. at 5. 
73. Id.  
74. See SHVERA REPORT, supra note 62, at 193. 
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retransmitted content is delivered via the Internet or coaxial cable. 
Relying primarily on the security rationale, the Copyright Office 
interpreted § 111 narrowly in CBC’s case.75 In doing so, it furthered 
the policy of revenue maximization for copyright owners and left a 
new system that was, to use the district court’s word, “meticulously” 
designed for compliance with § 111 to fend for itself on the 
retransmission market.76 The district court in ivi, distinguishing ivi’s 
service from CBC’s, expressly declined to say whether it found the 
Copyright Office’s rationale for rejecting CBC’s service 
“underwhelming.”77 The suggestion, of course, is that the court did 
find the Office’s rationale underwhelming. But ivi was not CBC, and 
it was ivi’s system, with all its warts, that was then before the court.78 
In light of the Copyright Office’s position on CBC, there was 
really no chance that it would approve Aereo’s application for a 
§ 111 license. Aereo’s only hope lay in the district court, which 
could justifiably have decided the case differently on remand. If 
“substantial similarity” to existing systems is the key to § 111 
eligibility, then there was ample basis in the Supreme Court’s 
opinion for a holding that Aereo should be considered a “cable 
system.” The Supreme Court’s holding was predicated almost 
entirely on the proposition that Aereo’s system was indistinguishable 
in every way that matters from traditional cable systems.79 To the 
extent that Aereo’s architecture differed from that of traditional cable 
systems, the Supreme Court held that “those differences [were] not 
adequate to place Aereo’s activities outside the scope of the Act.”80 
The Act, of course, includes § 111 as surely as it includes § 106(4), 
and the legislative history of the Transmit Clause establishes an 
inextricable and reciprocal policy link between them: with liability 
                                                     
 75. Id. at 193-94 (“[A] copyright owner should be allowed to assess the 
risks of putting its content on the Internet and negotiate private licenses . . . .”). 
 76. ivi I, 765 F. Supp. 2d 594, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, 691 F.3d 275 (2d 
Cir. 2012) (“CBC offered a meticulous explanation of its business model.”). 
 77. Id. at 613 n.26.  
 78. See id. (comparing ivi with CBC and stating that “even if one were to 
object to the Office’s conclusion in regards to CBC, in no way does it follow that 
ivi’s activity is permissible”). 
 79. See Aereo III, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2506 (2014) (“Aereo’s activities are 
substantially similar to those of the CATV companies that Congress amended the 
Act to reach.”); id. at 2507 (stating that Aereo’s system bears such an 
“overwhelming likeness” to cable systems that it is “for all practical purposes a 
traditional cable system”); id. at 2511 (concluding that Aereo’s activities are “highly 
similar to those of the CATV systems in Fortnightly and Teleprompter”).  
 80. Id. at 2511. 
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comes access to an exception. Moreover, ivi, which the Copyright 
Office invoked as the basis for denying Aereo’s application for a 
§ 111 license, is distinguishable on its facts. Ivi was held to be 
“vastly different” from existing cable systems.81 It served customers 
nationwide and refused to comply with requirements for cable 
systems in the Communications Act and its implementing 
regulations.82 The district court on remand in Aereo nevertheless 
concluded that ivi was “binding precedent,”83 citing (among other 
factors) the Office’s familiar concerns about signal localization and 
security on the Internet—concerns that ring somewhat hollow in 
light of the “meticulous” technical measures rejected by the 
Copyright Office in CBC’s case.84  
Fifteen years ago, the Copyright Office failed in its effort to 
have Congress amend the Copyright Act to expressly exclude 
Internet retransmission services from the scope of § 111. Subsequent 
events have shown, however, that the amendment was not needed to 
accomplish that exclusionary goal. Although Congress has never said 
no to the compulsory license for Internet retransmission, the 
Copyright Office has never said anything else.85 Putting aside the 
pro-consumer, pro-innovation policy rationale for creating statutory 
licenses, the Office has shown considerable determination over the 
long haul to keep such exceptions inelastic in the face of new 
technologies.86 Aereo is just the latest casualty. 
 IV. REWORKING THE LAW?  
It is too late for Aereo to benefit from any change in law that 
may come on the heels of its judicial defeats.87 But changes are 
                                                     
 81. ivi I, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 604. 
 82. Id. at 613 n.26. 
 83. Aereo IV, Nos. 12-cv-1540, 12-cv-1543, 2014 WL 5393867, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2014). 
 84. ivi I, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 613. 
 85. It has said, however, that a closed, proprietary system that uses the 
Internet Protocol (IP) to retransmit broadcast signals is within the scope of the § 111 
license, even though the system is not governed by the Communications Act and is 
“quite different” from a traditional cable system. See SHVERA REPORT, supra note 
62, at v, 194, 199 (describing AT&T’s U-verse service). Go figure. 
 86. For example, the Office was deeply critical of the Eleventh Circuit’s 
holding in SBN that satellite retransmitters were “cable systems” within the meaning 
of § 111. See ivi I, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 607.  
 87. See Greg Kumparak, Aereo to Be Pieced Out and Auctioned Off to the 
Highest Bidder, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 27, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/12/27/ 
 Aereo: Thinking Inside the (Cable) Box 481 
possible, if only in theory. The courts have not seen fit to disturb the 
Copyright Office’s position on the narrow scope of the § 111 license, 
but Congress could either amend § 111 to expressly include Internet 
retransmissions, as it did in 1994 for microwave retransmissions, or 
it could create a completely new statutory license, as it did in 1988 
for satellite retransmissions.88 Either course, however, would simply 
follow the existing pattern of technology-specific policy making on 
the exceptions side of the copyright balance. Neither would fulfill the 
more far-sighted goal of making copyright exceptions sufficiently 
elastic to support and incentivize the development of new 
technologies for disseminating copyrighted works.89  
The FCC could also intervene to address the communications 
regulatory obstacles confronting services like Aereo. Following 
Aereo’s defeat in the Supreme Court, Chairman Tom Wheeler 
proposed to change the definition of multichannel video 
programming distributor (MVPD) to include services like Aereo that 
retransmit signals over the Internet.90 Such a change on the 
communications-law side would guarantee retransmission consent 
and program access with respect to the signals of local 
broadcasters.91 It would not, however, bring Internet retransmission 
services within the scope of the § 111 license, leaving them to their 
                                                                                                                
aereo-to-be-pieced-out-and-auctioned-off-to-the-highest-bidder/ (reporting on the 
bankruptcy liquidation of Aereo’s assets). 
 88. See Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-369, § 3, 108 
Stat. 3477, 3480 (amending “the definition of ‘cable system’ by inserting 
‘microwave,’ after ‘wires, cables,’”); Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988, Pub. L. 
No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3949 (adding § 119). 
 89. While public dissemination of copyrighted works is no longer a 
requirement for copyright protection, it has always been and remains an important 
goal of the copyright system. See, e.g., JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 175 
(2001) (“Copyright makes sense as an incentive if its purpose is to encourage the 
dissemination of works, in order to promote public access to them.”).  
 90. See Tom Wheeler, Tech Transitions, Video, and the Future, OFFICIAL 
FCC BLOG (Oct. 28, 2014, 2:48 PM), http://www.fcc.gov/blog/tech-transitions-
video-and-future; see also Promoting Innovation and Competition in the Provision 
of Multichannel Video Programming Distribution Services, 80 Fed. Reg. 2078, 
2078-80 (Jan. 15, 2015) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 76). 
 91. See Draft Rulemaking Notice on Redefining MVPD Won’t Revolutionize 
OTT Access to Content, Industry Officials Say, WARREN’S CONSUMER ELEC. DAILY, 
Oct. 30, 2014 (reporting that the proposed rules would enable Internet services to 
take advantage of program access and retransmission consent rights vis-à-vis local 
broadcasters).  
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own devices to navigate the market for the copyrighted content 
carried on retransmitted broadcast signals.92  
Absent some legislative intervention to remove the copyright 
obstacles confronting services like Aereo, those services will be 
forced to compete for content with incumbent service providers—
i.e., cable and satellite—that derive significant competitive 
advantage from the narrow copyright exceptions they managed to 
secure when they were the new kids in town. Under the post-Aereo 
copyright regime, putting aside communications-law considerations, 
Internet retransmitters are required to compensate copyright owners 
at whatever rate the market will bear, assuming copyright owners 
choose to license their content to such providers at all. Cable and 
satellite systems, by contrast, have guaranteed access to the same 
content at statutory licensing rates. The law’s differential treatment 
of newcomers and incumbents in the retransmission market squeezes 
innovation that would increase consumer choice and public access to 
copyrighted programming. 
 CONCLUSION  
Thinking inside the box of the compulsory license was no 
solution for Aereo in a copyright system that tempers elastic, 
technology-neutral rights with inelastic, technology-specific 
exceptions.93 If there is a policy moral to Aereo’s story, it is that the 
Copyright Act needs to strike a better balance between rights and 
exceptions, so that new technologies for disseminating content can 
bring rewards not only for copyright owners but also for technology 
innovators and the public. Given the rapid growth in “zero-TV”94 
                                                     
 92. See id. (asserting that changes to the Copyright Act would still be 
needed to provide compulsory access to underlying copyrighted programs). 
 93. Fair use is the notable exception to this rule. See Matthew Sag, God in 
the Machine: A New Structural Analysis of Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 11 
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 381, 382, 384 (2005) (arguing that the fair use 
doctrine gives courts flexibility and space to make difficult policy decisions about 
copyright scope); see also Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 121, 140 (1999) (describing fair use, with its unclear boundaries, as a 
“muddy entitlement[]”). 
 94. A “zero-TV” household is defined by Nielsen as one in which residents 
forego traditional cable TV and satellite subscriptions in favor of streaming video 
online, via mobile devices, including laptops, tablets, and smartphones. See AJ 
Marechal, Nielsen Offers Focus on ‘Zero-TV’ Homes, VARIETY (Mar. 11, 2013, 6:10 
PM), http://variety.com/2013/digital/news/nielsen-offers-focus-on-zero-tv-homes-
1200006928/ (reporting that the number of “zero-TV” homes grew from around two 
million in 2007 to over five million in 2013). 
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households, it makes no sense to have statutory copyright licenses 
and the telecommunications regulations they reference tied to 
outmoded content-delivery technologies. The Second Circuit said in 
1982, and it remains true today, that “[t]he public interest . . . lies in 
[delivering] a continu[ous] supply of [diverse] programming to 
viewers.”95 How that programming is delivered—by coaxial cable or 
satellite or the Internet—shouldn’t matter under copyright law. 
Copyrights are technology neutral, and so should copyright 
exceptions be. Absent greater symmetry between rights and 
exceptions in the legal architecture of copyright, the technologists 
who design cheaper, faster, and more user-friendly ways of 
delivering programming to viewers will be boxed out, just like Aereo 
was. Under the current regime, it is the public that ultimately pays 
the price of the law’s failure to accommodate innovation. 
                                                     
 95. E. Microwave, Inc. v. Doubleday Sports, Inc., 691 F.2d 125, 132 (2d 
Cir. 1982). 

